The Virtue of Snobbery
An Argument in Defense of Artistic Appreciation
Central to the act of aesthetic appreciation is the idea of snobbishness. What defines a snob? How do snobs make aesthetic judgements? These are the questions asked by Matthew Kieran in his essay The Vice of Snobbery. According to Kieran, snobbishness needs to be separated from virtuous aesthetic appreciation because snobs make their judgements based on social factors. However, I will argue snobbishness as Kieren defines it is not always a bad thing. In fact, many times it can be a virtue in aesthetic appreciation. While rejecting someone based on their aesthetic beliefs, an action frequently associated with snobbishness, is uncalled-for, oftentimes the external or social reward in liking a work of art makes the appreciation genuine and makes the work of art worth enjoying.
Snobbishness, as Kieran defines it, is allowing aesthetically irrelevant social considerations to influence one’s appreciation for a work of art. As a background, Kieran states that snobbishness is prevalent in many fields, but especially in aesthetics. This is due to a reliance upon expert testimony, testimony not just on matters of fact, but matters of taste. While it is first and foremost the responsibility of the individual to decide what is aesthetically good and bad, experts make these claims as well. And so, expert testimony leads to a system in which agreement with the experts leads supposedly to a more respectful appreciation for art. Thus, an incentive is created for agreement with experts, or agreement with the social system as it is set up. This means that instead of judging a work of art on its own merit, the work’s position within the social structure is also taken into account. This is the basis for snobbishness.
Kieran separates snobbishness from what he calls ‘proper’ aesthetic appreciation. In proper appreciation, one’s opinion on a work of art is only based on relevant aesthetic values. A virtuous art appreciator therefore is one who bases judgment only on the work in front of them, while the snob looks to external or social factors. We ought to be more like the virtuous art appreciator and less like the snob, Kieran thinks. He says that snobbery is pervasive in the art world, and limits our true appreciation for works, tending to favor work which is already well appreciated, work which is appreciated by the ‘experts’ and work which makes some social statement about the appreciator.
In his explanation of snobbery, Kieran discusses the phenomenon as almost entirely negative. Snobbishness limits the art world through its prevalence and destructive tendencies. The idea seems to be that aesthetic judgements ought to be purely qualitative judgements of experience, and judgements of experience cannot be influenced by outside sources. If a judgment is influenced by an outside source, then it is not really a judgment of the artwork itself, but a judgment of some perception of the artwork. This perception, if influenced by social status, or general snobbishness, is not an accurate reflection of the artwork, and thus is unwarranted. However, I wonder if this is always the case. It seems to me as though snobbishness is not always bad. Additionally, I wonder if one can one ever truly separate art in its pure form from art as we perceive it in its social context? Again, I think that here, Kieran is mistaken.
Unlike Kieran, I would argue that snobbishness itself can be virtuous. For example, consider two appreciators of Pablo Picasso’s painting Guernica. This painting depicts the Spanish town of Guernica and the aftermath of its bombing during the Spanish Civil War. While the painting is aesthetically disturbing, it becomes even more disturbing when one knows its tragic background. So, let us assume that of the two appreciators, the first appreciator likes Guernica because they know it is one of the most influential paintings of the twentieth century. They know Picasso is a famous artist and is well respected in the art world. They might not know much about paintings, but they think that because this painting is well known and depicts a tragic act, that it is a good painting. This appreciator is influenced in this way by external factors and wants to be seen as well informed on art. Therefore, by Kieran’s definition, they are a snob.
The second appreciator of this work is only influenced by the painting itself. They know nothing about Picasso or Guernica, the Spanish Civil War, and think the painting is simply aesthetically interesting. Because of their lack of access to outside knowledge, they are in no way a snob. Am I to imagine therefore that the second appreciator holds more virtue in their aesthetic judgment than the first appreciator? This does not seem to be the case. While the first appreciator is snobbish, they also seem to have a better grasp on the painting, and by understanding the significance of the work, they also understand the painting itself more than the second appreciator.
Overall, I would argue that snobbishness opens up a wider variety of artwork to an audience, and understanding and allowing oneself to be influenced by its societal effects is what makes art enjoyable in the first place. Snobbishness is what allows recommendations to work in the first place. Conceivably, when I choose which book to read next, I am not choosing one at random. I am perhaps looking for a classic or a best-seller, or a friend’s favorite book. These are all external social considerations and therefore, by Kieran’s definition, I am a snob by allowing these considerations to alter my judgment. I will grant that this is in fact snobbishness on the condition that it also be recognised that snobbishness, in this context, is not a bad thing. It is, in fact, a virtuous heuristic which allows us to move through the aesthetic world in a purposeful and efficient way.
I think snobbish behavior can be warranted because a work which people are snobbish about has a likelihood to be a good work of art. To explain, I will use the example of Ulysses by James Joyce. Ulysses is a work which has had immense influence on the literature of the twentieth century and beyond. It has changed the literary landscape to such an extent that if someone is reading Ulysses, it is probably because of its influence and position in popular culture, rather than actually being interested in the life of a man in 1920s Dublin. To read Ulysses because of its influence is to be snobbish in appreciation of the book. However, this snobbery is warranted, because this snobbery can transform and become a virtuous appreciation of the work. An unforetold impact of Kieran’s claims is that we are all snobs. Who in the 21st century will read Ulysses without knowing its social influence? Who delves into a form of aesthetic appreciation without thinking also of social consequences? While not impossible, it is unlikely that social considerations have no influence on our aesthetic judgements. Importantly however, this is in no way an aesthetic vice.
In his essay, Kieran mentions a social experiment by Frederic Brochet in which students were given the wine in different containers and told to rate each. Even though the wine the students received was the same, the students were under the impression that they were meant to be tasting two different wines of different qualities. Therefore, the wine which was decanted into a fancier container was rated higher than the wine which was left as is, even though the wine itself was the same. What is even more interesting is the fact that in similar studies brain scans showed that students were really appreciating the wine more in the fancier containers. It wasn’t just that they reported enjoying the wine more, their brain actually showed real enjoyment more with the ‘fancier’ wine. This phenomenon shows an extremely interesting aspect of snobbishness. Fundamentally, it is not skin deep, snobbishness actually changes the way we perceive art. In other words, a snob does not know they are being a snob, they think they are actually appreciating the art. To Kieran, this might seem like a problem, but I do not think so. The reason is because of how this snobbishness comes about.
At this level, it is not only snobbishness which affects appreciation of art, but trust. Trust is placed in the system of art, or more broadly, the social system which is related to judgements in a particular area. The reason the wine tasted good in the experiment is not necessarily because the students were being tricked, it is also because they have placed trust generally in the way wine is presented, so that when it is presented in a way which makes the wine seem better, they also perceive the wine to taste better. When it comes to art, people have a similar level of trust. People may enjoy Ulysses because they are expected to enjoy Ulysses. This does not change the fact that they appreciate the novel though. Nor does it seem to be a vice like Kieran discusses. Instead, I see snobbishness as acting as a virtue in that it expands people’s horizons and exposes them to new works of art based on the testimony of experts.
Now, the counter-argument to this claim is all too obvious. While snobbishness involves the approval of some works of art, it also involves the disapproval of other works of art. If approving of a work of art is an aesthetic virtue, certainly disapproving of another work is a vice. I am inclined to agree with this argument in the case of aesthetic appreciation. Rejecting a work because of snobbishness seems in fact to be non-virtuous. If we make opinions in this regard based on the opinions of others, we are denying ourselves the opportunity to be proven wrong. However, I think in this case, it is only the audience member themselves who is being wronged. By denying themselves the opportunity to enjoy a work, they deny themselves the potential joy the work might give them. Therefore, while snobbishness can be helpful in deciding which works to observe, it is unhelpful and becomes a vice when it deals with which works to reject.
Snobbishness is a complicated issue in the field of aesthetics. While Matthew Kieran argues that snobbery is inherently a vice, I take a more nuanced view and think that there is plenty of good which can come from snobbery. Being a snob can lead us to works of art which are widely appreciated and give us context for the world of aesthetics in general. Additionally, snobbery can act as a heuristic for deciding which works to observe, and what to look for in a work. While snobbery can also lead us to avoid certain works, overall, it is helpful when used in moderation. Snobbery is in other words, not a vice, but a virtue.
Works Cited
Brochet, F. ‘Tasting: Chemical Object Representation in the Field of Consciousness’, http://www.academie-amorim.com.
Kieran, Matthew. “THE VICE OF SNOBBERY: AESTHETIC KNOWLEDGE, JUSTIFICATION AND VIRTUE IN ART APPRECIATION”. The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 60 No. 239. Pp. 243-263.
Joyce, James. Ulysses. London: Bodley Head, 1969. Print.
Picasso, Pablo. Guernica. 1936, Museo Reina Sofia, Madrid, Spain.